Desistance and “Aging-out” after Punishment by Haas, Henriette
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2015
Desistance and “Aging-out” after Punishment
Haas, Henriette
Abstract: The decline of criminal energy with growing age in the general offender population is replicated
in a similar pattern for the active and serious criminals. Predictions of their dangerousness can be made
more accurate by using longitudinal statistics on re-offending according to age, crime type and previous
convictions as base rates. For this purpose Blumstein and Larson (1971) conceived a model of the
interactions between offenders and the Criminal Justice System. It can be used to calculate the average
number of offenses committed by a given type of offender such as street criminals or sex offenders after
release from long prison sentences. As a consequence of the aging-out effect the number of offenses will
considerably reduced after several years behind the walls, even for those ex-convicts who were not able
or not willing to benefit from rehabilitation programs.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-105014
Submitted Version
Originally published at:
Haas, Henriette (2015). Desistance and “Aging-out” after Punishment. In: Kerley, Kent. The Encyclo-
pedia of Corrections. Beverly Hills CA: Wiley, 1-15.
Desistance and aging out  Haas 
 1 
Desistance and “Aging-out” of Offending after Punishment 
Henriette Haas 
 
 
Entry to  
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORRECTIONS 
(including the Blumstein model, statistics and formula with permission of Jusletter) 
 
Abstract 
The decline of criminal energy with growing age in the general offender population is 
replicated in a similar pattern for the active and serious criminals. Predictions of their 
dangerousness can be made more accurate by using longitudinal statistics on re-offending 
according to age, crime type and previous convictions as base rates. For this purpose 
Blumstein and Larson (1971) conceived a model of the interactions between offenders and the 
Criminal Justice System. It can be used to calculate the average number of offenses 
committed by a given type of offender such as street criminals or sex offenders after release 
from long prison sentences. As a consequence of the aging-out effect the number of offenses 
will considerably reduced after several years behind the walls, even for those ex-convicts who 
were not able or not willing to benefit from rehabilitation programs. 
Patterns of aging-out 
One of the key topics of penology is the effect of punishment on multi-recidivists and 
criminals with long sentences. It is also a political issue raising heated debates. All statistics 
show a gradual decline of offending with growing age—for males as well as for females. The 
older they get, the more offenders tend to desist from criminal activities. Eventually almost all 
will settle down. This is called the aging out effect. Most criminologists agree that criminal 
recidivism is a failure to mature, a delayed transition into adulthood, but they differ about the 
variance or invariance of this effect across the lifespan. The psychological school, e.g. 
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represented by Moffitt (1993, 1994), claims the existence of two types of antisocial 
trajectories: adolescence-limited offenders (ALO) and persistent offenders (PO). The latters’ 
antisocial behavior goes back to their childhood and their crimes tend to be more frequent and 
more serious than the formers. POs also show more psychopathology than ALOs, whereas the 
ALOs resemble much more the non-delinquent population (abstainers)—in every respect. 
This concept falls in tune with the results of cross-sectional studies, beginning with 
Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin’s (l972) who showed that a small number of persisters do 
enormous damage as they account for the biggest share of offenses and especially for almost 
all of the severe violent crimes committed by the members of a birth cohort. Moffit (2002) 
also showed with prospective longitudinal data that boys with severe childhood antisocial 
symptoms practically never recover. Even cases which seemed to have disappeared from the 
official records for a certain time span, unfortunately re-surfaced in the Justice system later.  
The sociological school, represented e.g. by Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983), claims the 
invariance of aging-out: they see gradual desistance in all offenders. Statistical evidence for 
the aging out process shown as curves of recidivism depending on age as well as on the 
number of previous convictions is difficult to find, but we did find data from Denmark 
(Figure 1) and one from the UK (Figure 4). These show a distinct, but slower decline in 
recidivism for the more active offenders compared to the rest. Figure 1 manifests the offense 
cluster committed by PO with more than 5 convictions. Thus the data mitigate theoretical 
controversies. 
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Figure 1. Number of re-convictions of males according to age and previous convictions 
(StatBank Denmark, last visited on Jan. 20th 2014) 
 
Longitudinal studies on complete biographies of (former) offenders now shed a new light on 
the criminal career debate (Sampson & Laub 2003). These authors have collected the follow-
up data on the Glueck sample of 480 delinquent boys. They found a universal pattern of 
desistance, varying for different types of crimes committed by the same group. Property crime 
peaks sharply during adolescence, becoming quite insignificant after age 25. For violent crime 
there is a rather flat inverted U-curve, beginning shortly before the twenties and lasting into 
the mid-thirties for the men. The curve of violence is overlaid by a much higher and wider 
inverted U-shape concerning alcohol and drug related crime, lasting from the early twenties 
until the beginning of the fifties for the men. One fourth of the men who survived to age 50 
seemed to have stopped crimes of violence and property after age 17 (no arrests), half of them 
after age 25, and 80% had no arrests for predatory crime after age 40. Their data suggest that 
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the age-crime decline in the general population is replicated—almost in the same fractal 
fashion—for the active serious offenders.  
Finally there is the very problematic group of the most severe criminals, such as leading 
organized crime figures and persistent sexual and violent predators. Even though they 
represent only a tiny fraction of the population, they attract the most media attention. For 
central Europe (FSO 1997) the prevalence of truly dangerous violent and sex offenders is 
about 1 out of 10,000 inhabitants (judged by the severity of prison sentences). Even if in more 
crime-ridden countries this figure could be doubled, no prospective study can ever contain a 
sufficient number of those rare cases so as to evaluate their offending pattern, not even those 
composed of juvenile delinquents. Considering the length of their sentences and the 
impossibility to release them when they are in their late thirties without risking victims and 
major scandals, they gradually build up the stock of inmates in maximum-security 
correctional facilities all over the world. Finding appropriate aging-out limits for them 
depends very much on the collection of longitudinal data such as shown in Figures 1 and 4 as 
base rates, which allow the application of Bayes’ theorem in the actuarial prediction of 
dangerousness (Wollert 2006). 
In conclusion both psychological and sociological schools have a point: Desistance is 
universal, however there seem to be personality-related clusters according to the severity of 
the antisocial behavior. A growing body of neurological studies (e.g. Raine, Moffitt, Caspi, 
Loeber, Stouthamer-Loeber & Lynam 2005) provides insights into probable causes for the 
occurrence of clusters. Adolescence-limited offending seems to be heavily mediated by the 
teenage brain’s reorganization under the hormonal surge, whereas persistent offenders suffer 
from frontal-executive dysfunctions since childhood, causing psychiatric symptoms of 
ADHD, addictions or personality disorders. This being said, social and psychological 
Desistance and aging out  Haas 
 5 
influences do also play a role, they can create, reinforce or contain neurological deficits. 
Cluster patterns stem from the neuronal network’s capacity to compensate deficits to a certain 
degree. With an accumulation of too many risks and when the load becomes too heavy, it 
organizes itself in a different manner. Then again this explanation remains incomplete as long 
as base rates of similar neurological deficits in the general population and the counterfactual 
are unknown, i.e. if there are any such neurologically affected individuals without antisocial 
tendencies. 
Considering aging-out after punishment 
It is widely recognized that non-custodial and custodial sanctions are quite effective for two 
thirds of all first-time offenders. Controversies about the efficiency of punishment focus most 
on the question of how to deal with multi-recidivists and with severe felons. The high 
recidivism rate of former prisoners is one frequently heard argument for a supposed 
inefficiency of incarceration (with finite sentences). There is also an implicit belief that 
deterrence by sanctions must totally prevent any new offense or else it would not be working 
at all. This fallacy originates from the confusion between re-conviction rates of individuals (in 
Figure 4) and the actual number of offenses committed (in Figure 1) or prevented. It also 
results from not considering the aging-out effect on recidivism in the later stages of a criminal 
career. Thus the real issue for public security is not the percentage of re-convictions, but the 
number of committed offenses and the increase or decrease in their severity of. The very 
existence of Criminal Justice puts a constant pressure on offenders—forcing them to be much 
more cautious than they would be otherwise. This greatly reduces their opportunities to 
commit crimes.  
Unfortunately the number of prevented offenses is difficult to estimate while re-arrest and 
reconviction figures are easily available. Blumstein and Larson (1971) created a Markov 
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chain (Figure 2), modeling the interactions between offenders and Criminal Justice. The 
number of offenses (the expectation E) is a function depending on the offender’s proneness to 
crime and on the possibilities to thwart crime by prosecution. The model consists of four 
states:  
state 1 (transient)  = active offending 
state 2 (transient)  = apprehension by the police 
state 3 (transient)  = conviction by the court 
state 4 (absorbing)  = desistance from further offending.  
It also contains conditional probabilities (o = offending, a = apprehended, c = convicted): 
pa = p(a|o) the probability that an offender be (apprehended) arrested by the police   
   after an offense 
pc = p(c|a) the probability that a police suspect be convicted after being apprehended  
   for the offense 
p1 = p(o|o) an offender’s proneness to re-offend under uncontrolled circumstances 
p2 = p(o|a) an offender’s proneness to re-offend after having been contacted by the police 
p3 = p(o|c) an offender’s proneness to re-offend after having been convicted 
 
The transition probabilities within the model, the paths between the states, are unconditional 
probabilities. So the offender’s return to state 1 is his individual proneness to offend 
multiplied by the probability of not being arrested (1–pa), etc. 
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Figure 2. Interactions between offenders and Criminal Justice (Blumstein & Larson 1971) 
 
Let P be the transition-probabilities of the Markov-model with the elements Pij as transition-
probabilities from one state i to the state j, then: 
 
(1) P = 
€ 
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Note that the certainty C of punishment (Beccaria) is the product C = papc. Let δ  be the unity 
matrix (δ ij = 0 for i≠j and δ ii=1 for all i). The expectation matrix E covers the average number 
of visits to the different states before the system reaches its absorbing state: 
 
(2) E(P) = 
€ 
pk
k=0
∞
∑  = 
€ 
δ
δ − P  = 
€ 
(δ − P)−1  
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We need only the first diagonal element E11 here, i.e. the number of expected offenses after 
the first one. The others, namely E22, the number of police contacts and E33, the number of 
Court convictions, could be relevant for other computations.  
 
(3) E11 = 
€ 
1
1− p1+ pa(p1 − p2) + papc(p2 − p3)  
 
Among the variables in P we do know pc from the comparison of Police and Court statistics. 
Under the assumption that we are dealing with persistent offender of the worst kind: those 
who remain unimpressed by the criminal justice system, the formula for E (expected offenses 
after the first one) can be simplified. For such offenders we have p1 = p2 = p3 which simplifies 
the denominator of all elements and contains only one unknown: 
 
(4) E11 = 
€ 
1
1− p1  
Figure 3 shows that the expectation of offenses relates the offender’s proneness to commit an 
offense in a non-linear way.  
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Figure 3. Hyperbolic function of the expectation of the number of offenses 
 
For as long as the psychological proneness to offend remains below the value of p1 ≈ 0.8 there 
are not too many offenses to be expected. For p1 = 0.8 there will be five per time period. 
However, the more p1 approaches the value of 1 (which stands for the condition of remaining 
unpunished) the steeper the expectation curve mounts. For p1 = 0.95 the offenses average on 
20, whereas for p1 = 0.98 there are 50 and for p1 = 0.99 there are even 100 offenses expected. 
The hyperbolic nature of this curve explains why a total absence of sanctions leads to a 
disproportional increase of crime and that deterrence is a mathematical function and not a 
constant. Countless times History has proven the asymptotic increase of crime under 
conditions of anarchy, for example after the hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 2005 or after 
the conquest of Bagdad by the US troupes in 2003. The political experiment with the open 
drug market in Switzerland during the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called needle park, provided 
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yet another window to observe the total failure of a policy of laxness. Furthermore there is not 
a single society known to live peacefully without laws and sanctions. At the same time the 
curve shows that absolute deterrence is not necessary at all. It suffices that chances to succeed 
with offending be significantly reduced by a reasonably high certainty of punishment C. From 
the perspective of the offender the existence of the Criminal Justice System considerably 
reduces his opportunities. It forces him to be much more cautious. Because of the non-linear 
shape of the expectation a small percentage of reduction in the probability to offend can be 
quite effective in reducing the total number of offenses committed by recidivists.  
Next we want to explore the impact of a prison sentence on the expectancy of offenses with 
regard to the decline of offending with growing age. We still ignore pa, p1, p2, and p3 because 
their values fall under the dark figure of undetected crime. Hence we need a middle step to 
calculate those probabilities from other known statistical parameters, such as the re-conviction 
probability after a first conviction (in Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Recidivism according to age and number of previous convictions 
(Lloyd, Mair & Hough, Home Office 1995, table B.1 appendix, p.77) 
 
Let the matrix H be defined as the probability that a state i from the chain be ever re-visited 
from another state j in a finite number of steps (across all states that the system assumes 
stochastically until it stops in the absorbing position). To obtain the formula for H we can 
relate it to the expectation matrix E. It is the expectation of visits minus 1, divided by its 
diagonal.  
(5) H = (E – δ)(δE)-1 
Obviously H11 is the same as p1, the proneness to reoffend for a recidivist, and S = 1 – H33 is 
the survival rate after release from a sentence. To calculate p1 we need police statistics H22 
(probability for a re-arrest of former police suspects) and court statistics H33 (probability for a 
reconviction of ex-convicts): 
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(6) H22 = 
€ 
pap2 + papc(p3 − p2)
1− p1(1− pa)  
    
(7) H33 = 
€ 
papcp3
1− p1+ pa(p1 − p2) + papcp2  
 
Knowing the values of H22, H33 and pc from official statistics, and assuming the worst case 
scenario of p1 = p2 = p3 for simplicity, we now have a system of two equations with only two 
remaining unknowns p1 and pa, which is solvable (in theory).  
For an evaluation of the efficiency of prison terms for career criminals, we will take the 
example of a violent drug dealer at age 24. Let him be convicted for the sixth time and give 
him a de facto 6-year prison term.  
 
(8) H33 = 
€ 
papcp1
1− p1+ papcp1  
 
This fictive street criminal will be released shortly after his 30th birthday. As there was no 
complete set of longitudinal crime statistics available containing H22, H33 and pc we have to 
estimate certain parameters. Let us estimate pa = 0.3 and pc = 0.7. This assumption seems 
reasonable in the light of all the registered offender data available about him (photographs, 
DNA, fingerprints, whereabouts, contacts, etc. from the probation office). Then we can insert 
the values for H33 from Figure 4 and calculate the expectation of offenses: 
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Before incarceration (curve with squares):  H33 = 69% E(69%) = 11.6 offenses 
During incarceration (6 years)   E      <    3   offenses 
(assuming that within walls offending is greatly reduced but not eliminated) 
After liberation (curve with circles):  H33 = 43% E(43%) =   4.6 offenses 
As a consequence of incapacitation during the critical years, prison prevented an estimate of 
67 offenses. After liberation society gets back an older, less active ex-convict, whose criminal 
energy has been considerably reduced. Even if this person is not rehabilitated in the least, he 
will commit less than half of his former total offenses per time period. Chances that he will be 
caught again are still 45%. If such cases seem to be a failure of the system, the impression is 
false – what counts is the number of prevented offenses. 
Using this example we can read two tendencies. First, except in cases of the severest violence 
and offenders with high PCL-R scores, lifelong incapacitation such as the „3-strikes “-law are 
not needed to protect the public from the deeds of persistent offenders. These solutions are 
costly for tax-payers without providing additional security. Second, it does indeed make sense 
to imprison rehabilitation-resistant multi-recidivists during their most risky years in order to 
protect society. Any legislation seeking a reasonable compromise between the interests of 
society, victims and offenders, should beware of excesses in both directions: neither too much 
leniency nor too much severity make sense. 
SEE ALSO:  
Beccaria, Cesare 
Deterrence 
Incapacitation 
Rehabilitation 
Recidivism 
Habitual offender laws 
Three Strikes laws 
Incarceration rates 
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